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Abstract
On the political-legal plane, the direct consequence of the May coup organized by Józef Piłsudski in 
1926 was an amendment of the March constitution of 1921. The above amendment was commonly 
referred to as the August amendment from the name of the month in which the two laws changing 
the constitution had been passed (2 August 1926). The core of the August amendment consisted in 
a strengthening of the position of the executive organs of the state at the expense of the Diet and the 
senate. The president obtained the right to dissolve parliament before the end of its term, following the 
motion of the ministers’ council. Moreover, the president obtained the prerogatives to pass resolutions 
with the power of parliamentary laws and obtained new budgetary prerogatives. Parliament, on the 
other hand, became restricted as regards its powers to pass a no confi dence vote towards the Ministers’ 
Council or any individual minister. The political conceptions implemented by the interwar government 
aimed at doing away with the principle of a tri-partite division of state power in favor of a concentration 
of power in the hands of the state’s president. The above conception had been fully realized in the new 
constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1935.
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In the interwar period writers on the Polish constitutional law pointed to two goals of 
Marshal Piłsudski coup d’état of May 1926 – “moral sanation” and a strong executive. 
Piłsudski himself proclaimed these goals in his key speech to the representatives of all 
the parties in the Sejm at a cabinet meeting on the 29th May 1926. Dr. Antoni Chmurski 
in his book “Nowa konstytucja” (“The New Constitution”) wrote:
* This article is an expanded version of a paper delivered at the organized by prof. Kazimierz Baran 
international conference: Poland and Hungary in the interwar-time. Their constitutional systems and the 
court-applied law, held in Cracow on 19–22 September 2011.
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He saw moral sanation as his fi rst and chief task, “Widespread thievery, committed with impunity, 
is the main reason why Poland is in such a sorry state today, i.e. poor and weak, both internally 
and in its external relations. First of all, the domination of selfi sh interest of individuals and par-
ties, impunity in the case of abuse [of power] and other crimes... I have declared war on all crooks, 
rogues, murderers and thieves and I will not give up... My aim is to suppress fraud and pave the 
way for honesty.” About his second goal – the strengthening of the executive branch of government 
– Piłsudski said this, “the Sejm and Senate have too many prerogatives and it is necessary to give 
more rights to those who have been appointed to govern…” (…). Whenever called to justify his 
radical programme of actions Pilsudski would invariably point to the harmful usurpation of power 
by the Sejm, and especially the Sejm oligarchy, the domination of narrow party loyalties, and the 
general lowering of standards in public life. Of the two goals proclaimed by Marshal Piłsudski, 
one was moral, the other political. One envisaged a sweeping moral reform, the other called for 
a constitutional reform.1
The quotations from Piłsudski’s speeches offer a fairly accurate picture of his and his 
followers’ intentions on the eve of the coup in May 1926. They believed that Poland was 
in need of sanation, i.e. a cure that would restore the health of its political system. In their 
program they planned to prevent the encroachments of the Sejm into the sphere of execu-
tive government and to alert self-serving politicians to the primacy of the general inter-
est, or raison d’état. While that belief was not new, it was in early 1926 that Piłsudski 
and his followers became convinced that even a coup was not too high a price for getting 
the ailing state apparatus on the road of the necessary reform. Whether they were right in 
their judgment is matter of controversy. The debate has continued ever since the “events 
of 1926” and, like other disputes of this kind, is unlikely to end in an agreement. 
Soon after the 1926 coup, lawyers working for the new regime prepared a draft of 
amendments to the 1921 Constitution. The Amendment of August 1926, as it came to be 
known after the month in which it was adopted, came into force on the 2nd August 1926.2 
Another bill strengthening the position of the president was passed on the same day. It 
empowered the President to issue decrees with the force of an act of parliament.3 
The core objective of the Amendment was to strengthen the executive powers at the 
cost of those exercised by the Sejm and the Senate. First of all, it gave the President 
the right to dissolve Parliament before the end of term at the request of the Council of 
Ministers. He could do it no more than “once for the same reason”; the measure had to 
be announced and justifi ed in a presidential address.4 This amendment replaced a clause 
in the 1921 Constitution which sanctioned the dissolution of Parliament when a motion 
to this effect gained the approval of 3/5 of Senate votes. Similarly, members of the Sejm 
could no longer decide on the issue of dissolution. According to the 1921 Constitution 
such a motion could be put to the vote and take effect when backed by 2/3 of at least half 
of the total number of deputies. The decision, if taken in the lower chamber, resulted in 
1 A. Chmurski, Nowa konstytucja [The New Constitution], Warszawa 1935, pp. 5-6. 
2 Ustawa zmieniająca i uzupełniająca Konstytucję Rzeczypospolitej z dnia 17 marca 1921 r. [Law on 
Amending and Supplementing the Constitution of the Republic of the 17th  March 1921], (Dz.U. [Journal of 
Laws of the Republic of Poland], 1926, No. 78, item 442).
3 Ustawa o upoważnieniu Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej do wydawania rozporządzeń z mocą ustawy [Law 
on authorizing the President of the Republic to Issue Decrees with Force of Law], (Dz.U. 1926, No. 78, item 
443).
4 Art. 4 of the Ustawa zmieniająca i uzupełniająca Konstytucję... [Law on Amending and Supplementing 
the Constitution…] which amended Art. 26 of the 1921 Constitution.
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the dissolution of the Senate at the same time. In fact, the 1926 Amendment deprived 
Parliament of any right to infl uence the presidential decisions concerning its dissolution. 
According to the new procedure, the president needed only the cooperation of the gov-
ernment (the Council of Ministers), i.e. its formal request to dissolve parliament, before 
taking action. However, within the framework of reforms postulated by the “Sanation” 
movement, this requirement was a mere formality, or rather an attempt to create an im-
pression that president’s freedom of action depended on other organs of the state. It may 
be noted here that the later adopted 1935 Constitution gave the President the prerogative 
of dissolving the Sejm and the Senate before the end of term.5
The Amendment of 1926 gave the Head of State the right to issue statutory decrees 
under two conditions.6 Firstly, his decrees had to be adopted at a time when both houses 
of parliament were dissolved, and they had to remedy “an emergency that affected the 
state”. Secondly, a law adopted by the parliament could authorize the president to is-
sue decrees “over a period and within a scope indicated by that law.” Indeed, the latter 
condition was met that very day, when a piece of legislation authorizing the president to 
produce decrees was adopted alongside the amendments.
However, there were several fi elds normally subject to constitutional or parliamen-
tary regulation that were exempted from the presidential decree7 – he could not intervene 
in the affairs of local government,8 the budget,9 the military,10 parliamentary control 
over the national debt,11 matters of war and peace12, ministerial accountability under the 
constitution,13 monopolies and customs duties, electoral law at all levels, laws concern-
ing language, marriage, and, which may appear odd, anti-alcohol legislation.14
On the formal side, a presidential decree had to be based on the articles of the con-
stitution and relevant parliament acts already in force. Moreover, it had be preceded by 
an appropriate request from the Council of Ministers; the decree had to be signed by the 
president, the prime minister and all the ministers; and fi nally, it had to be published in 
the offi cial Journal of Laws (“Dziennik Ustaw”). A presidential decree might become 
invalid in two cases – fi rstly, if it was not presented to parliament for approval within 
14 days from the beginning of the parliamentary session following the issue, and second-
5 Art. 13 sec. 2 (h) of the 23 April 1935 Constitution (Dz.U. 1935, No. 30, item 277).
6 Art. 5 of the Ustawa zmieniająca i uzupełniająca Konstytucję... [Law on Amending and Supplementing 
the Constitution…] which amended Art. 44 of the 1921 Constitution.
7 Art. 2 of the Ustawa o upoważnieniu Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej do wydawania rozporządzeń z mocą 
ustawy… [Law on Authorizing the President of the Republic to Issuing Decrees with the Force of Law…].
8 Art. 3 Par. 4 Consitution of 1921.
9 Art. 4 Consitution of 1921.
10 Art. 5 Consitution of 1921.
11 Art. 8 Consitution of 1921.
12 Art. 50 Consitution of 1921.
13 Art. 59 Consitution of 1921.
14 It is worthwhile to note that the limitations of matters in which the President could not issue decrees 
were listed also in Art. 5 of the Ustawa zmieniająca i uzupełniająca Konstytucję... [Law on Amending and 
Supplementing the Constitution…]; cf. footnote 6. Among the Articles of the 1921 Constitution within the 
scope of which the President could not issue the decrees, there may be found Art. 6 referring to fi nancial 
matters. This Article was however left umentioned in Art. 2 of the Ustawa o upoważnieniu Prezydenta 
Rzeczypospolitej do wydawania rozporządzeń z mocą ustawy… [Law on Authorizing the President of the 
Republic to Issue Decrees with Force of Law…] (other Articles that were listed remained unchanged).
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ly, when it was presented as required but was rejected by the assembly. It is clear from 
a review of the specifi c legal clauses attached to the institution of the presidential decree 
that its use was subjected to a number of restrictions and conditions. This construction 
was intended to increase the effectiveness of the state apparatus without depriving the 
legislature of its key decision-making role in matters of paramount importance to the 
state. 
The 1926 Amendment did give the President some competencies with regard to the 
budget. He could now promulgate the government’s budget bill if the Sejm and the 
Senate failed either to adopt or reject it within the constitutional timetable.15
It should also be noted that other amendments restricted the powers of the Sejm to 
force the resignation of ministers or the Council of Ministers as a whole in a vote of no 
confi dence. Under the new regulation, the motion of no confi dence could not be put to 
the vote immediately, but it had to wait until the following session.16 The measure was 
aimed at shielding the government and individual ministers from being brought down 
by a rash and possibly ill-judged vote; the delay was introduced to give the members 
time to refl ect coolly on ways of resolving the crisis. Furthermore, Article 22 of the 1921 
Constitution which addressed the issues of confl ict of interest and restricted public of-
fi cials’ private interests was expanded to include a penal sanction. It stated that a member 
found in breach of this law will lose his seat and forfeit “all the proceeds acquired from 
the government”.17 Again the legislator’s intention is clear: to install a strong legal deter-
rent to those offi cials who are tempted to use their position to receive government orders 
for their private businesses, an abuse all too common in any democracy. 
More generally, the 1926 Amendment was intended as a fi rst step towards a con-
stitutional order which emphasized the unity of the state, or, in other words, a greater 
concentration of power in the hands of the president. It initiated a process of constitu-
tional change which broke with the traditional tripartite division of powers. The shift 
did go unnoticed. As one of the leading parliamentarians of the interwar period Wacław 
Makowski observed in a strongly-worded, sarcastic comment, made shortly before the 
adoption of the amendments in July 1926: 
Society’s interests must be taken care of by somebody who is appointed to do it, and who has all 
the necessary authority to head off any threats and to defeat those elements that may try to take 
over our system. These issues require prompt action. If such issues become the subject of lengthy 
deliberations, if the question is raised whether the problem comes within the purview of the leg-
islature, and whether it needs to be debated, and whether it is necessary to discuss what has been 
happening in one village or another, and whether an offi cial treated a member of parliament with 
less than due respect, the prestige of parliament will be upheld, but the most vital issues of state will 
be neglected. That is why we need to work out a separation of powers on a different level, a separa-
tion between the legislature whose job is to give broad directions, and the acting executive which 
must be equipped with each and every prerogative it needs to deal with the urgent issues brought 
up by the life itself. [...] Montesquieu is a venerable old man, an old man whose time has passed. 
15 Art. 3 of the Ustawa zmieniająca i uzupełniająca Konstytucję..., [Law on Amending and Supplementing 
the Constitution…] which amended Art. 25 of the 1921 Constitution.
16 Art. 6 of the Ustawa zmieniająca i uzupełniająca Konstytucję..., [Law on Amending and Supplementing 
the Constitution…] which amended Art. 58 of the 1921 Constitution
17 Art. 2 of the Ustawa zmieniająca i uzupełniająca Konstytucję..., [Law on Amending and Supplementing 
the Constitution…] which amended Art. 22 of the 1921 Constitution.
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To solve our problems, we must use the tools adequate to the challenges of modern life, not those 
from Montesquieu’s intellectual kit.18
The 1926 Amendment paved the way for a new constitution of the Republic of 
Poland, which was adopted on the 26th January 1934 and which came into force on the 
23rd April 1935. In 1931, its author, Stanislaw Car, summed up the functioning of the 
March 1921 Constitution (with the 1926 amendments) as follows: 
Since May 1926, when new raison d’état was introduced, it has been possible to curb the squander-
ing of the state resources and start cleaning up the mess. Many of the abuses that had fl ourished in 
the old epoch of “Sejmocracy” have been uprooted; parliamentary life has been liberated from the 
tyranny of senior members’ meetings; the fl ux of unending sessions has been replaced by orderly 
procedure within a timetable set down by the constitution; the laws that guaranteed the president the 
exclusive right to appoint and dismiss the government have been restored; parliamentary immunity, 
which must not be seen as a license to act with impunity, but a public law protection enjoyed by 
members of parliament in pursuit of their duties, has been scaled back to its proper constitutional 
frame; and fi nally, the 2 August 1926 Amendment made it possible to have the budget passed in 
time, to dissolve the Sejm, and generally to get things done by a presidential decree which had the 
force of an act of parliament.19 
And he continues: “[…] the 2 August 1926 Amendment is just a fi rst step on the road to the imple-
mentation of the programme of the post-May 1926 government […]. The direction of the reforms 
has never been a secret. They are motivated by the need to establish a strong executive that would 
secure to our new state a steady and glorious development and would raise Poland to the rank of 
great powers, ready to face down any threat to its sovereignty. The new government knows that the 
realization of these objectives is impossible without a shift in the constitutional balance in favour 
of the President’s offi ce. The extension of presidential executive powers is consistent with the 
democratic system and respects the parliamentary right to a reasonable, fact-oriented supervision 
of government work.20
The constitutional change inaugurated by the 1926 Amendment is believed to have 
pushed Poland closer to a group of nations whose political system was based on ‘author-
ity’. The Polish version of authoritarian rule (or “Caesarism”, as it was often called), 
formulated by the ideologues of the movement headed by Marshal Piłsudski, envisaged 
a concentration of state power in the hands of the executive, i.e. the offi ce of the presi-
dent. Although the post-1926 system had many fl aws and the way it worked in practice 
attracted a lot of criticism, its adoption did not turn the interwar Republic of Poland into 
an authoritarian state, as it is sometimes claimed. In Poland, the constitutional order was 
respected; so were the fundamental democratic principles as well as human rights and 
18 W. Makowski, O naprawie konstytucji po raz drugi – zmiany. Przemówienie sejmowe z 17 lipca 1926 r. 
[The Improvement of the Constitution Rediscussed. The Question of Amendments. The Speech Delivered in 
the Sejm on 17 July 1926] [in:] Wacław Makowski o państwie społecznym [Wacław Makowski on the Social 
State], ed. W.T. Kulesza, Warszawa 1998, pp. 77−78.
19 S. Car, Naprawa ustroju – koniecznością państwową. Mowa wygłoszona na plenarnym posiedzeniu 
Sejmu w dniu 3 marca 1931 r. [Constitutional Improvement as a Necessity for the State. The Speech Delivered 
at the Plenary Sejm Session on 3 March 1931 [in:] Stanisław Car – polska koncepcja autorytaryzmu 
[Stanisław Car  – the Polish Concept of Authoritarian System], ed. J.M. Majchrowski, Warszawa 1996, p. 71.
20 Idem, Konstytucja 17 marca a polska rzeczywistość [The 17th March Constitution and the Polish 
Reality], Warszawa 1930 [in:] ibidem, p. 55.
The Amendment of August 1926 to the first Polish Constitution of the Second Republic
322 Grzegorz M. Kowalski
Artykuły – Articles
liberties of the citizens. The contrast between the allegedly authoritarian Polish politi-
cal system and the authoritarian regimes of the neighbouring states, Hitler’s Germany 
and Stalin’s Soviet Union, could hardly be more striking. It was that very neigbourhood 
that in a way elicited the Polish reaction, which, arguably, could hardly have been dif-
ferent. In order to survive – insisted the politicians that came to power in 1926 – Poland 
had to be strong and had to have a well-functioning, effi cient political system. Adam 
Skwarczyński, a leading ideologue of the Sanation reform camp, put it this way: 
Political systems and constitutions can be grouped in many different ways. Let me therefore intro-
duce yet another classifi cation, between those constitutions that are easy and those that are hard. 
Constitutions that have not given a wide berth to the ancient regime under which there was little 
difference between the citizen and the subject, belong to the former category. Equally easy are 
the well-known democratic constitutions drafted to please the masses. Neither one nor the other 
requires any effort of cooperation on the part of the citizen. Instead they assume his passivity which 
comes in two forms, a passive obedience in the face of authority or a readiness to follow the call of 
the propagandist. The Polish constitution is going to be hard. It puts the citizens to the test and it 
enforces a selection resulting from constant exertion – exertion which is not rewarded by a direct 
personal gain. (...) The hardness of the Polish constitution matches the discomforts of our geo-
graphical and cultural position; it demands from a Pole an unwavering commitment to the public 
good; it presents Poland with a recurring choice, the country can either be strong, or it will become 
an easy prey to its neighbours.21
Unfortunately, recent history has shown that Poland could not or was not able to 
withstand in confrontations with totalitarian neighbours. The reforms of the parliamen-
tary system, set in motion in 1926 and carried on with remarkable persistence, did not 
prevent Poland’s defeat in September 1939. This shows that even a well made consti-
tutional system, perfectly suited to cope with one set of circumstances cannot win with 
larger historical processes. Nor can it ensure nation’s prosperity. Ultimately, regardless 
of the excellence of their laws and constitution, the fate of nations and states depends on 
the character of the individual people who are in power and make the crucial decisions. 
This is the lesson history has taught the Poles repeatedly over the last centuries.
21 A. Skwarczyński, Doświadczenia społeczne a konstytucja [Social Experience and the Constitution] 
[in:] Adam Skwarczyński – od demokracji do autorytaryzmu [Adam Skwarczyński – from Democracy to 
Authoritarian System], ed. D. Nałęcz, Warszawa 1998, p. 227.
